Password Protection
SkySend supports optional password protection using Argon2id (WASM, memory-hard, GPU-resistant).
How It Works
Password protection adds an extra layer on top of the encryption secret. The secret is XOR'd with a password-derived key, making it unrecoverable without the password.
Upload: protectedSecret = secret XOR passwordKey
Download: secret = protectedSecret XOR passwordKeyThe XOR operation is reversible, so the original secret can be recovered by applying the same password key.
Key Derivation Function
Argon2id
Argon2id is a memory-hard KDF that is resistant to GPU and ASIC attacks. SkySend uses it via a WASM implementation in the browser.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Memory | 65,536 KiB (64 MiB) |
| Iterations | 3 |
| Parallelism | 1 |
| Hash Length | 32 bytes |
These parameters follow the OWASP strong recommendation for Argon2id.
const { key, algorithm } = await deriveKeyFromPassword(password, salt, argon2id)
// algorithm = "argon2id-v2"Password Salt
A 16-byte random salt is generated per upload:
const passwordSalt = randomBytes(16) // PASSWORD_SALT_LENGTH = 16The salt and the algorithm identifier are stored on the server so that the downloader can derive the same password key.
Upload Flow
- User sets a password during upload
- Client generates a password salt
- Client derives
passwordKeyfrom the password - Client computes
protectedSecret = secret XOR passwordKey - Client sends
X-Has-Password: true,X-Password-Salt, andX-Password-Algoheaders - The share link now contains the
protectedSecretinstead of the raw secret
Download Flow
- Client fetches upload info, sees
hasPassword: truewithpasswordAlgoandpasswordSalt - User enters the password
- Client derives
passwordKeyusing the stored algorithm and salt - Client recovers
secret = protectedSecret XOR passwordKey - Client derives keys and computes
authToken - Client verifies the password via
POST /api/password/:idwith the derived auth token - If the token matches, the server returns the encrypted metadata, which
GET /api/info/:idholds back for a password-protected upload, and the download proceeds
Without the metadata nobody can test a guess offline, so every guess has to pass the password check or the download, which share one lockout. Someone who holds both the link and the server's database can still guess offline at the cost of one Argon2id run per guess, which is why the clients ask for at least MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH (8) characters for a new password. Only the clients can check that, since the server never sees the password.
Constants
| Constant | Value |
|---|---|
PASSWORD_SALT_LENGTH | 16 bytes |
MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH | 8 characters, for a new password |
DERIVED_KEY_LENGTH | 32 bytes |
ARGON2_PARAMS.memory | 65,536 KiB |
ARGON2_PARAMS.iterations | 3 |
ARGON2_PARAMS.parallelism | 1 |
ARGON2_PARAMS.hashLength | 32 bytes |
Security Considerations
- Unique salt per upload - Prevents rainbow table attacks
- Memory-hard KDF - Argon2id is resistant to GPU/ASIC brute-force
- Server never sees the password - Only verifies the derived auth token
- UTF-8 encoding - Passwords are consistently encoded as UTF-8 before hashing